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RECENT DECISIONS
retroactive in application to policies written previous to that date. Pawlowski v.
Eskofski, 209 Wis. 189, 244 N.W. 611 (1932) ; Baker v. Tormey, 209 Wis. 627,
245 N.W. 652 (1932). Legislation permitting direct joinder of the insurer has
been held to invalidate no action clauses in many jurisdictions. Globe Indemnity
Company v. Martin, 214 Ala. 646, 108 So. 761 (1926); Ruiz v. Clancey, 182 La.
935, 162 So. 734 (1935) ; Lunt v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 261 Mass. 469,
159 N.E. 461 (1927) ; Stacey v. Fidelity and C. Co., 114 Ohio State 633, 151 N.E.
718 (1926). The case at issue must be distinguished from Sheehan v. Lewi,
218 Wis. 588, 260 N.W. 633 (1935), where the no action clause was held
unenforceable, the policy being written by a Massachusetts insurance company
protecting a Wisconsin corporation. The court said that the statute shall govern
and render the conflicting provisions inoperative. The interpretation of a per-
sonal contract is referable to the place where it was made. International Harves-
ter Co. v. McAdam, 142 Wis. 114, 124 N.W. 1042 (1910) ; McKnelley v. Brother-
hood of American Yeomen, 160 Wis. 514, 152 N.W. 169 (1915). An insurance
policy made in and to be performed in Wisconsin by non-residents is to be
governed in its validity and effect by the laws of Wisconsin. North Western
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Adams, 155 Wis. 335, 144 N.W. 1108 (1914). The pro-
visions or laws of the state where the contract is made will be recognized in
other jurisdictions unless against the statutes, powers, rights, or the well settled
public policy of the other jurisdiction. Missouri State Life Insurance Co. v.
Lovelace, 1 Ga. App. 446, 58 S.E. 93 (1907). It was held in Clarey v. Union Cen-
tral Life Insurance Co., 143 Ky. 540, 136 S.W. 1014, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 763, (1911)
that a no action clause as to the period within which to bring a suit would be
recognized in another state though contrary to its public policy.
The no action clause in a liability insurance policy secures a valuable
right, Pawlowski v. Eskofski, supra. To disregard the provision is to place upon
the insurer a greater obligation than that contracted for, and results in an
impairment of the contract between the parties, contrary to Section 10, Article
I of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitu-
tion of Wisconsin. One of the tests that a contract has been impaired is that
its value has by legislation been diminished. Planters Bank v. Sharp, 6 Howard
(U.S.) 301, 12 L.ed. 447 (1848); Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U.S. 126, 41
Sup. Ct. 408, 65 L.ed. 857 (1920). If the effect of impairment is produced, it is
immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy or directly on the contract
itself. Pawlowski v. Eskofski, supra. In the case at issue, the court determined
that, as the no action clause would be valid in Illinois, the insurer is entitled to
the rights thereunder, and to permit joinder of the insurer would be unconstitu-
tional as an impairment of a contract. In a case directly in point and with
identical facts, Riding v. Travelers Insurance Company, 48 R.I. 483, 138 Atl. 186
(1927), the court held that the insurer's obligation under the policy was not
variable or dependent upon the jurisdiction in which the insured drove his car.
JOHN T. McCAmumR
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S CoPENsATioN-ARISING OUT OF AND IN
THE COURSE OF EmPLOYMENT.-The claimant is the widow of the deceased. She
made claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act against
the deceased's employer. The deceased was killed while he was returning from
a week-end trip at his lake home. He was on his way to assume his duties as
salesman for the defendant company. The claimant contended, and proof sus-
tained her claim, that deceased frequently made stops on return trips to deliver
batteries and car accessories to his employer's customers. She failed to substan-
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tiate her allegations that the deceased had delivered two batteries that were in his
car and which he was expecting to deliver on the particular return trip in ques-
tion. The accident occurred before the deceased had reached the point on his trip
where he would turn off to cover his scheduled route. The Industrial Commission
awarded compensation to the widow. On appeal to the circuit court judgment
was entered dismissing the claim. On appeal to the supreme court, held, judgment
affirmed. This death was not compensable as growing out of and incidental to
the deceased's employment. Automotive Parts and Grinding Co. v. Industrial
Commission (Wis. 1936) 264 N.W. 492.
Whether the salesman, who mixes pleasure or private business with his sales
occupation, can recover compensation under a Workmen's Compensation Act,
if he is injured, or whether his estate can get compensation, if he is killed,
depends upon facts and circumstances which the Commission must consider
specially in each case. The formula traditionally applied by courts and commis-
sions was first enunciated in the master-servant, third party liability cases. In
Joel v. Morison, 6 C. & P. 501, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338 (1834), Baron Parke pur-
ported to distinguish between a mere "detour" on the part of the servant engaged
upon the master's business, and a "frolic" of the servant. Compare Thomas v.
Lockwood Oil Co., 174 Wis. 486, 182 N.W. 841 (1921), where the servant, a
truck driver, went out of his way on his return trip "to kill time," and where
the court classified the trip as a "detour" and not a "frolic." The English Work-
men's Compensation Act is the source of the phrase "arising out of and in the
course of the employment," incorporated by the Wisconsin legislature into the
local statutes in 1911. Wis. Laws (1911) c. 50; see Wis. STAT. (1935) 102.03.
Courts cannot lay down a hard and fast rule of interpretation. The limits of
the relationship of employer and employee, master and servant, are necessarily
elastic. See Kock, Workmen's Compensation Act and Incidental Occupation
(1933) 8 St. John's L. Rev. 107. In Schmiedeke v. Four Wheel Auto Co., 192
Wis. 574, 213 N.W. 292 (1927) it was conceded that the trip was made in the
interest of the employer although the deceased had carried on personal business
while covering his route. It was a compensation case and the court decided that
the accident had occurred within the course of employment and that the Indus-
trial Commission should make the claimed award. In Southern Casualty Co. v.
Ehlers, 14 S.W. (2d) 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), where the statute contained a
similar provision about scope of employment, the court held that the injury
complained of had not occurred in the course of employment. The injured per-
son was an automobile salesman. He had driven into town to interview prospec-
tive purchasers but he had also made arrangements to attend a social function
in which he personally was interested. In Harvey v. Bakers & Consumers Com-
pressed Yeast Co., 244 App. Div. 838, 279 N.Y. Supp. 511 (1935) compensation
was allowed for the deceased's death where it appeared that he had taken cer-
tain merchandise with him at night which he was preparing to deliver in the
morning when he was killed on his return trip and while he was about to make
deliveries. The New York court has tried to phrase a more precise test to be
applied to these cases than the old formula about detour and frolic. See Marks
v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181 (1929). So long as the job of the employee
creates the necessity for travel, he is acting in the course of employment even
though he makes use of the occasion to serve some purpose of his own. And
the Wisconsin court in a compensation case has pointed out that, if the trip
would not have been made had the private errand been cancelled, then the trip is
not made in the course of employment and compensation can not be awarded
to the injured person or to his dependents if the employee is killed. Barrager v.
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Industrial Commission, 205 Wis. 550, 238 N.W. 368 (1931). In that case the
deceased was permitted by his employer to make a special trip to bring his wife
home from a vacation visit. Incidentally he was expecting to call upon some
of his employer's customers. The court felt that the personal interest was the
primary reason for the trip. In the principal case the court refers to the Bar-
rager case as decisive in the case before it. See also Githens v. Industrial Com-
mission (Wis. 1936), 265 N.W. 662, a compensation case, and Fawcett v. Gallery
(Wis. 1936), 265 N.W. 667, a third party liability case.
THOMAS J. BERGEN.
MATERIALMEN'S LIENS-STATUTORY BONDS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCToiN.-The
plaintiff sold iron posts to the Badger Company. The latter shipped them to the
principal contractor who had entered into a contract with the state to build a
bridge. The principal contractor, unaware of plaintiff's claim, paid the Badger
Company which company later went into receivership. Dividends from that pro-
ceeding not having been declared, the plaintiff brought this action against the
principal contractor and his surety, obligors on a bond required by statute. The
trial court ordered judgment for the plaintiff, concluding it to be the duty of
the defendants to have ascertained the plaintiff's status. On appeal, held, judg-
ment reversed; a principal contractor doing public work is not liable to a sub-
contractor of a subcontractor. Subsequent liberalizing of the lien law to include
remote claimants did not extend the remedy afforded by the Public Works Act,
Gilson Bros. Co. v. Worden-A4lien Co., (Wis. 1936) 265 N.W. 217.
Until amendment the mechanic's lien law expressly denied the right of a lien
to a subcontractor of a subcontractor. See Wis. REv. STAT. (1878) § 3315. In this
exclusion was seen a recognition that building construction would be hampered
by permitting a multiplication of liens on the part of distant claimants. Dalhman
v. Clasen, 116 Wis. 113, 92 N.W. 566 (1902). The Public Works Act making
mandatory a bond to insure compensation to materialmen and laborers partici-
pating in public contract projects was enacted in 1899 as a substitute for the lien
accessible on private undertakings. See Wis. STAT. (1935) § 289.16. Its protection
is available to "parties in interest" By judicial interpretation claimants have
been restricted to the kind or nature of claims approved by the lien law. Wis-
consin Brick Co. v. Nat. Surety Co., 164 Wis. 585, 160 N.W. 1044 (1917). Most
courts have declined, in the absence of express direction, to limit such statutes
in conformity with the restrictions of lien laws, but construe them independently
to fulfill an apparent legislative purpose to secure the payment of all persons
contributing to public improvements however far removed from contractual
relationship with the principal contractor. Franzen v. Southern Surety Co., 33
Wyo. 15, 246 P. 30, 46 A.L.R. 496 (1926); Trenton v. N. J. Brick & Supply Co.,
112 N. J. Law 218, 171 At. 176 (1934); Eagle Oil Co. v. Altm n, 129 Okla. 98,
263 Pac. 666 (1928). It is the minority view that courts should not extend the
protection of the bond to remote claimants not expressly included by statute.
Miller v. Bonner, 163 La. 333, 111 So. 776 (1926) ; Paurote v. State, 111 Ind.
73, 11 N.E. 476 (1887).
In the principal case the default did not occur because of the mismanage-
ment or insolvency of the principal contractor. Timely notice would have warned
him against payment to the defaulting subcontractor until the plaintiff's claim
was secured. In Berger Mfg. Co. v. Lloyd, 209 Mo. 681, 108 S.W. 52 (1908), the
subcontractor was denied recovery on the bond because it was not shown that
he relied on the principal contractor for payment, but that he merely dealt in
the ordinary course of business upon the immediate subcontractor's credit
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